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ABSTRACT 
 
Research into new uses for known drugs should be encouraged 
because the “repurposing” of known drug molecules can be a highly 
effective route of innovation for pharmaceutical companies. 
Investment in the development of these products should be rewarded. 
However, incentives that are designed to reward innovation must be 
in line with the size and value of the innovation in order to maintain a 
sustainable balance between incentivizing research and developing 
and encouraging a competitive market. In the context of encouraging 
innovation of new uses for known drugs, factors that facilitate access 
to drug development and innovation should also be considered in 
addition to incentives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Both innovative and generic pharmaceutical companies may 
invest in research into new uses for known drugs.  This “repurposing” 
of known drug molecules can be an effective route for innovation 
Most importantly, it takes advantage of the extensive body of 
knowledge, research, and clinical experience that has already been 
gained through the use of known treatments. By combining this body 
of data with technological advances made since the discovery of a 
given drug molecule, significant and previously unknown uses for 
such drugs may be uncovered. 
The future of the pharmaceutical industry, and the patients who 
rely on it, depends on the continuous development of new and 
improved treatments. Innovation is important—this is as true for the 
generic medicine sector as it is for “innovative” pharmaceutical 
companies. Generic pharmaceutical companies depend on innovation 
in the pharmaceutical industry, and recognize that innovation can be 
risky and may require substantial investment in research and 
development. Such investment should certainly be rewarded. 
However, it is important to maintain a fair balance between rewarding 
innovation and assuring patients’ access to affordable healthcare. 
Incentives designed to reward innovation must be in line with the size 
and value of the innovation in order to maintain a sustainable balance 
between the goal of incentivizing innovation and of rationalizing 
health care budgets through generic entry into the market. 
Despite the above, generic pharmaceutical companies are often 
characterized as opposing incentives for innovation. This may be 
because their business models sometimes comprise of bringing legal 
challenges with the aim of invalidating exclusivities that are designed 
to provide incentives to innovate.  However, it does not follow from 
this that generic companies do not support incentives for innovation. 
In fact, the reverse is true: generic companies support sensible rewards 
and incentives for innovation.  What they oppose are rewards 
disproportionate to the actual degree of innovation and amount of 
effort required to benefit from the reward, and the abuse of such 
incentives to prevent the legitimate market entry of competitors.  
Systems currently exist to govern how medicines are developed, 
licensed, protected, and priced; each has the potential to encourage or, 
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if mismanaged, to stifle innovation. In Europe, the development of 
novel medicinal compounds is incentivized and rewarded in a way 
that is regarded by industry and effective and beneficial overall. 
However, incentives and rewards are not as beneficial or effective 
when they concern innovations in treatment made from developing 
already-known substances for new uses, formulations, methods of 
delivery and so on.  
This Article focuses on the development of new treatments by the 
repurposing of known drugs. The debate on how to encourage 
innovation in this area usually centers on the incentives available for 
repurposed drugs. This Article considers such incentives, but also 
looks at another important aspect: how access to various key 
components of the field—such as data, funding, and skills—can be 
critical to the successful development of a repurposed drug product. It 
suggests that the current system of incentives is unbalanced, with new 
active substances receiving extensive protection and with innovations 
based on development of known active substances receiving little or 
effectively no reward.  
It is possible to strike a better balance between encouraging 
innovation in known drugs by rewarding innovation and improving 
access to data and other key elements, and allowing for optimal access 
to the market to the benefit of all stakeholders. Industry and payors—
primarily the National Health Services of the Member States in 
Europe—have the same goals: providing broad availability of fairly 
priced quality medicines. Patients often want new treatments, but 
would also benefit from treatments that could be developed from 
known medicines, which could be made available more quickly due 
to their confirmed safety. These may also offer other advantages over 
the older drug, such as being more convenient to take or having a more 
convenient dosing regimen.  
More can be done better to incentivize patient-focused 
development of known drugs. A new system of incentives should 
recognize that developing known drugs may be cheaper and require 
less investment while nevertheless providing a marked improvement 
in patient care. This Article proposes that a reward system where the 
duration and extent of the reward is tied to the size of the innovation 
would ultimately benefit the industry.  
The pharmaceutical industry is capable of repurposing drugs. In 
particular, generic companies are well-positioned to make patient-
focused developments of known treatments. Generic companies are 
4
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol12/iss3/5
2017]  INNOVATION IN KNOWN DRUGS            257 
 
 
 
particularly focused on understanding the demands of the market and 
delivering products that the market wants in a competitive, non-
exclusive and at times, commodity-driven environment. Payors also 
benefit from such innovations; patients who understand their 
treatment regimens and better comply with them may save Health 
Services money by putting fewer demands on healthcare providers.1 
However, without effective reward for the investment in identifying 
and developing these sorts of innovation, companies may not pursue 
opportunities, for fear that they may fail to deliver sufficient financial 
return.  
 
I. INCENTIVES – ISSUES AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
 
The pharmaceutical industry plays a unique role in the functioning 
and advancement of society; that role is recognized in the particular 
systems of reward, authorization, and pricing for health care products. 
In particular, the high cost of development of new treatments versus 
the relatively low cost to third parties of copying such discoveries 
means that a robust scheme of protection of innovation is needed in 
order to reward investment in new treatments for patients. Such a 
scheme has been developed through the patent and regulatory systems 
which reward innovation through the granting of exclusivities which 
provide a market monopoly for a fixed period.  However, for 
innovations in treatment that arise from repurposing known drugs, 
these same systems are not always as effective. This is not a result of 
a deliberate policy to offer less protection to repurposed drugs,2 but 
because current systems offer inadequate protection and certainty. If 
investment in new uses for known drugs is to be encouraged, this 
situation must change. Although the development of a repurposed 
drug would usually be more straightforward than the development of 
an entirely new drug, it may still require substantial effort and 
investment. It is therefore important to provide incentives for 
                                                                                                                
 
1 Aurel O. Iuga & Maura J. McGuire, Adherence and Health Care Costs, 7 RISK 
MGMT. & HEALTHCARE POL'Y 35 (2014), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3934668/. 
2 The “new” use of a repurposed drug may sometimes be referred to as a “second 
medical use”. 
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investment, though any such incentives should of course be 
proportionate to the effort and investment required to develop the 
repurposed product.  
In Europe, the market protection available for medicinal products 
may broadly be divided into two categories.  The first comprises the 
intellectual property exclusivities awarded by the patent system.  The 
second consists ofthe regulatory exclusivities available by virtue of 
the functioning of the regulatory legal framework i.e. the system for 
granting marketing authorizations for medicinal products as overseen 
by various Regulatory Agencies. 
 
A.  Issue: Patents3 
 
1. The Current Framework 
 
A patent provides the right to prevent others from selling, 
developing, manufacturing or distributing a product, or from 
conducting a process, that is covered by the patent in question.4 The 
term of European patent protection is twenty years from the filing 
date.5 
The product or process described in the patent must be both 
novel—that is, not described anywhere in the world prior to the 
priority date of the patent—and inventive—that is, “not obvious” to a 
hypothetical non-inventive skilled person.6 The invention must also 
                                                                                                                
 
3 This section discusses a number of different cases relevant to the patent 
protection that is available for repurposed medicines. This article does not 
provide an exhaustive review of the case law in this area and the cases 
mentioned are only discussed in order to provide illustrative examples of the 
problems that have been encountered in this field. 
4 Acts that infringe a European patent are governed by national law see 
Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention), 
art. 63, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255, as amended by the Act Revising the 
European Patent Convention, Nov. 29, 2000, available at http:// 
documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/00E0CD7FD461C0D5C125
7C060050C376/ $File/EPC_15th_edition_2013.pdf.  The relevant national 
law in the United Kingdom, for example, is the Patents Act, 1977, ch. 37, § 
60.   
5 Id. at art. 63. 
6 Id. at art. 54 and 56. 
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be clearly disclosed:7 enabling the public to perform the invention 
once the term of protection has expired is the quid pro quo for 
providing the monopoly. Finally, the inventions must be “patentable 
subject matter”, that is subject matter that is not excluded from 
protection.8 The patent system therefore protects adequately disclosed 
innovation in the literal sense of inventions that are “new” and “not-
obvious”. Drugs that consist of novel chemical compounds are 
invariably protected by patents and therefore the developer of the drug 
benefits from a twenty-year monopoly, during which no competitor 
can produce a generic version of the drug. 9 
In the pharmaceutical sector, extensive research and testing is 
necessary for the development of medicines. Further, regulatory 
approval is required before a medicine can be placed on the market.10 
Due to the increasing complexity of medical research and 
development, and to compensate for the extensive period of time 
needed to obtain a regulatory approval, the European Parliament 
introduced a Supplementary Protection Certificate (“SPC”) system,11 
which enabled the granting of additional protection to medicinal 
products in the form of a product-specific extension to the term of the 
patent.12 This enables the approved product that resulted from the 
development and regulatory approval process to benefit from the 
protection of the patent for an additional period of up to five years.13 
This system provides compensation for the delay caused by the 
regulatory approval process in reaching the market by enabling a 
                                                                                                                
 
7 Id. at art. 83. 
8 Id. at art 53. (listing certain things which may not be patented). 
9 See supra note 6. 
10 Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 
November 2001 on the Community Code relating to medicinal products for 
human use, art. 6, 2001 O.J. (L 311) 67. 
11 The current European legislation that governs SPCs is Regulation EC No. 
469/2009, which replaced Regulation EC No. 1768/92. 
12 Regulation (EC) No. 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
6 May 2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal 
products, art. 4, 5 and 13, 2009 OJ (L 152) 1.  
13 Id. at art. 13. 
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longer presence on the market without generic competition.14 Since 
SPCs are patent-based rewards, and provide an extension in duration 
of the patent term based on the timetable to grant of marketing 
authorization for a medicinal product protected by that patent, it is in 
some senses a “hybrid” reward: based on both the patent protection 
over a product and the marketing authorization granted to that product. 
  
2. Patent Protection for Repurposed Drugs 
 
It has long been recognized that the patent system appears to be 
inadequate to protect discoveries based on the development of known 
drugs.15 The first attempt in Europe to implement a system whereby it 
was possible to patent the invention of second medical uses for known 
products was the introduction of Swiss type claims. These were 
introduced under the European Patent Convention of 1973 and were 
so named because they were based on the advice and practice of the 
Swiss Patent Office.16 They allowed the granting of patents for second 
medical uses of known substances provided the claim was drafted in 
the following format: 
“Use of substance [X] for the manufacture of a 
pharmaceutical composition for new therapeutic 
application [Y].” 
Their purpose was to turn subject matter previously excluded from 
patentability—specifically, methods of treatment of the body—into 
patentable subject matter. This is achieved by granting a claim that is 
a joint product-and-process claim—albeit one that incorporates the 
use for which the product and process is conducted. Swiss type claims 
were superseded by the introduction of the European Patent 
Convention 2000.17 Second medical use claims under the EPC 2000 
                                                                                                                
 
14 Id. 
15  See Mr. Justice Jacob, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd v Istituto Gantili Spa 
& Ors [2003] EWHC 5 (Pat), and the overview of the problem provided by 
Scott Parker and Ben Hall, Skinny labelling infringement: finding a fair 
remedy, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MAGAZINE (Sept. 3, 2013), 
http://www.intellectualpropertymagazine.com/patent/skinny-labelling-
infringement-finding-a-fair-remedy-91356.htm. 
16 Approval was given in decision G5/83 dated 5 December 1984. 
17 Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention), 
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are typically in the format: 
“Use of substance [X] in new therapeutic application 
[Y].”18 
For some time, it was also uncertain whether SPCs could be 
available for repurposed medicinal products. However, the decision 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Neurim case 
confirmed that such protection is available.19 The case concerned the 
medicinal product melatonin, which had first been authorized as a 
treatment for the control of seasonal breeding in sheep.20 Neurim had 
subsequently obtained patent protection and a marketing authorization 
for melatonin for treatment of insomnia in human adults.21 The 
question for the Court was whether the first authorization to place the 
product on the market in the EU for the purposes of granting an SPC 
was the authorization for the veterinary product. If that had been the 
case, then an SPC would not have been available. The court found 
that, in practice, the first authorization for use in animals had offered 
no assistance to Neurim, for whom it had taken fifteen years to get 
their melatonin product to the market. The effect of the Court of 
Justice decision was that Neurim could be rewarded, through the 
granting of an SPC, for their work on developing melatonin for use in 
humans despite the fact that melatonin was a known drug that had 
previously been used in animals.  
As discussed above, European legislators have decided that 
discoveries of second medical uses for medicinal products should be 
protectable under the patent system.22 Authorities that grant patents 
have introduced the necessary architecture to grant such patents. 
However, this has led to cases where courts attempt to reach the 
“right” decision, but in doing so complicate this area of law. The 
Neurim SPC case is one such example. This creative interpretation of 
                                                                                                                
 
art. 54(5), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255. 
18 European Patent Office Guidelines for Examination, Part G, Chapter VII, 
Section 7.1.  
19 See, e.g., Case C-130/11, Neurim Pharmaceuticals (1991) Ltd v Comptroller-
General of Patents, 2012 E.C.R.  
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 See supra notes 17, 18 and 19. 
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the SPC Regulation was at odds with the black letter of the law as well 
as numerous earlier SPC cases. This has led to some uncertainty in 
other SPC cases and the necessity for further references by national 
Courts to the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
  
3. Problems with Patent Protection for Repurposed Drugs 
 
Despite the checkered history of patent protection for repurposed 
drugs, it is now accepted that patents which protect second medical 
use claims are acceptable and that SPCs for such claims may be 
available. Further, courts have recognized that it is possible to obtain 
a patent and an SPC to protect a repurposed drug.23 However, the 
utility of these exclusivity rights may still be compromised due to 
problems relating to validity and enforceability. Both of these issues 
have been considered by national Courts in Europe. 
In the English case of Merck v. Teva & Arrow,24 Mr. Justice Jacob 
commented on the validity problem. The drug at issue was 
alendronate, which was discovered and used in the 1960s but was 
repurposed in the 1990s for treatment of osteoporosis.25 Two 
secondary medical use patents were challenged in the case. Both were 
found to be invalid because of work done with a precursor compound 
of alendronate called pyrophosphonate.26 Jacob found that this work 
meant the patents must be invalid because it rendered use of 
alendronate for the treatment of bone loss obvious.27 In his judgment, 
commenting on his finding that both patents were invalid, Jacob said: 
 “I do so with some regret. Merck have only had a few 
years' exclusive exploitation of alendronate. They must 
surely have had to make a very considerable 
investment and incurred considerable risk in bringing 
it to market. And mankind is better off as a result.” 
“But the patent system does not confer monopolies on 
                                                                                                                
 
23 See supra note 20. 
24 [2003] EWHC 5 (Pat). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at paragraphs 36 to 64. Note that the patents were also found invalid for lack 
of novelty and because it was a method of treatment of the human body by 
therapy. 
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those who develop obvious or old products, even if 
they have never been exploited. A workable system for 
that might be a good idea, particularly in the field of 
medicine and analogous fields.” 
The problem with enforcement of second medical use patents is 
illustrated by a decision of the Dutch Court of Appeal at The Hague 
in preliminary relief proceedings regarding Novartis’ zoledronic acid 
product.28 The patent concerned a second medical use of zoledronic 
acid for the treatment of osteoporosis and the delivery mechanism and 
dosage form of such. The first known—and no longer patented—use 
for the drug was treatment of Paget’s disease. The Novartis marketing 
authorization for Aclasta contained indications for treatment of 
osteoporosis and Paget’s disease.29 Sun Pharmaceuticals, had 
obtained a marketing authorization for its generic zoledronic acid 
product with a so-called “skinny label” for the treatment of Paget’s 
disease only. A “skinny label” is a term used for a generic marketing 
authorization where one or more patent-protected indications granted 
to the reference product have been excluded deliberately from the 
generic label. Skinny labeling is provided for in Directive EC 
2001/83—often referred to as the “Medicines Directive”—to account 
for just such a situation.30 The idea is that a product with a skinny label 
will not infringe patent rights because it does not instruct the user to 
use the product in a way that would infringe the patent. 
In this situation, it is clear, assuming the second medical use patent 
is valid, that the patent should be enforceable against use in the 
patented indication. However, it should not prevent market entry of a 
generic product for use in treating indications for which there is no 
patent protection in place. Taking the zolendronic acid example 
above, assuming the patent for use of zolendronic acid for the 
treatment of osteoporosis is valid, it ought to be possible to enforce it 
                                                                                                                
 
28 Court of Appeal The Hague in Novartis AG v. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, 
27 January 2015, case number C/09/460540 / KG ZA 14-185, 
ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:1769.  
29 Id. at paragraph 2.7 
30 Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 
November 2001 on the Community Code relating to medicinal products for 
human use, art. 11, 2001 O.J. (L 311) 67. 
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to prevent generic zolendronic acid products being used for the 
treatment of osteoporosis.  In relation to other indications for which 
there is no patent protection, such as Paget's disease in the zolendronic 
acid example, generic products should not be prevented from being 
used.  Skinny labeling of generic products deals with this problem in 
theory as a skinny label excludes any patented indications.  Therefore 
generic products with a skinny label are not authorized for use in the 
patented indications. However, although a skinny label can state that 
the product should be used for the non-patented indications only, in 
practice this does not necessarily prevent prescribing, dispensing, and 
use of the generic product in patented indications. The producer of the 
generic product does not have any control over how its product is 
prescribed, dispensed, and used once it is on the market. It seems 
unfair to penalize them via patent enforcement litigation if the generic 
product ends up being used for patented indications. On the other 
hand, a patentee ought to be able to enforce its patent. 
In the Novartis case, the Dutch Court of Appeal decided to 
approach this issue by considering whether, despite the use of the 
skinny label, Sun knew or should have known that its product would 
be used in a way that would infringe the patent—i.e. that it would be 
used to treat the patented indications.31  The Court of Appeal found 
that, notwithstanding the skinny label, Sun knew or should have 
known that its product would be used for the patented indications: the 
amount of product it supplied far exceeded the amount that would be 
needed to meet patient need for the Paget disease indication. As a 
consequence, the Court of Appeal held that Sun had conducted 
contributory infringement of Novartis' patent, and handed down a 
preliminary injunction against Sun. (In a more recent decision in 
parallel proceedings on the merits, the Hague District Court has in an 
interim decision held, on different grounds, that Sun had not 
conducted contributory infringement of Novartis' patent32, but that it 
                                                                                                                
 
31 Court of Appeal The Hague in Novartis AG v. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, 
27 January 2015, case number C/09/460540 / KG ZA 14-185, 
ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:1769, paragraphs 4.33 - 4.34.  
32 District Court The Hague in in Novartis AG v. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, 
25 November 2015, case number C/09/469148 / HA ZA 14-770, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:14337. The District Court held that because a Swiss 
type claim is a purpose limited process claim and its protection does not also 
cover the product itself, there can only be contributory infringement if a party 
 
12
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol12/iss3/5
2017]  INNOVATION IN KNOWN DRUGS            265 
 
 
 
cannot be excluded that it has directly infringed the patent.33)  
The major problem with this approach, however, is a lack of 
certainty. A patentee should be able to assume that its patents will not 
be infringed, and third parties should be able to market a product for 
uses that are not patent-protected without either party having to rely 
on the Court to adjudicate.  
Recent litigation in the UK High Court and Court of Appeal34  
concerning the drug pregabalin further illustrates this problem. In 
these proceedings, a number of the defendants had obtained market 
authorization for their generic products using skinny labels.35 In this 
case, further measures were taken to prevent so-called off-label use, 
in addition to ensuring that the marketing authorization granted was 
for the skinny label only. One such measure was to write to the 
superintendent pharmacists of all UK Clinical Commissioning 
Groups, instructing them to inform their members that only Pfizer’s 
brand product, Lyrica, was to be prescribed and/or dispensed for 
treatment of the patented indications.36 The Court further sanctioned 
written guidance to NHS England—as representative of the National 
Health Service—which informed all prescribers and dispensers that 
they should only prescribe or dispense Pfizer’s Lyrica for patented 
indications.37 This litigation is still ongoing and so the issues are by 
no means finally settled. 
Exclusivities for known drugs that have been repurposed are 
available, in theory, in the form of patent and SPC protection. 
                                                                                                                
 
would supply an essential element knowing (or with reasonable grounds to 
know) that this element would be used by a third party in applying the 
protected process, i.e. manufacturing the drug. As Sun had only supplied the 
already manufactured drug, Sun could not be said to have supplied an 
essential element which would subsequently be used by third parties to 
manufacture the drug.  
33 Id. As the subject of direct infringement came up at a rather late stage of 
proceedings, the District Court refused deferred a decision on this aspect of 
the case, and requested parties to file additional deeds instead. 
34 Warner-Lambert Company, LLC v. Actavis Group PTC EHF & Others, [2015] 
EWHC 72 (Pat). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. from paragraph 78 onwards. 
37 Id. 
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However, in practice, the enforcement of these exclusivities is highly 
problematic. This inherent uncertainty means that these protections do 
not provide an appropriate or suitable system for incentivizing the 
development of repurposed medicines. 
 
B.  Potential Solution: eHealth 
 
Problems concerning the validity of second medical use patents 
are difficult to resolve through the patent system. These are perhaps 
better addressed by rewarding such innovations with regulatory 
exclusivity, as discussed below.  Similarly, the problems with 
enforcement discussed above would be hard to solve through changes 
to the patent system itself. However, enforcement issues can be 
resolved by the increased use of eHealth38 technologies solutions and 
technological support systems. 
Take, for example, the problems that arise when attempting to 
enforce a second medical use patent where there are both patented and 
non-patented indications, and a generic company wishes to launch a 
product with a skinny label directed at the non-patented indications. 
This problem is illustrated by the zolendronic acid and pregabalin 
cases discussed above.39 Such problems could be rectified by creating 
a new mandatory prescribing and dispensing system. Requiring 
prescriptions to include the indication for which the drug is prescribed 
would remove the uncertainty around whether generic products are 
being dispensed against patented indications despite using a skinny 
label. Those who dispense prescriptions would become the gateway 
towards ensuring that drugs are dispensed only as permitted. Such a 
system would act to tie the prescription and dispensing of a drug to its 
intended use. However, this scenario can only occur via mandating the 
prescriber’s recording of the indicated use. 
This system would help not only in ensuring that drugs are 
prescribed in line with patent needs, but would also make any damages 
claim easier to assess in the event of dispute about the validity of the 
patent. Prescribing and dispensing data would show not only how 
much of the relevant products were used, but would also show the 
                                                                                                                
 
38 eHealth is a term used to describe health care practices that are supported by 
electronic processes and communication. 
39 See supra notes 29 and 32. 
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proportion of the market that relates to each indication.  
With the increased availability and sophistication of technologies 
(such as ePrescribing40 and eHealth records) the infrastructure is in 
place for this data to be generated and accessed.  
 
1. An Example: The Substitution System in Denmark 
 
Some countries in Europe are already taking steps that create 
closer ties between patent protection and prescription decisions. In 
2015, the Danish Health Authority implemented new rules on 
substitution for prescriptions.41 In Denmark, generic medicines are in 
the same “substitution group” as medicines that contain the same 
active substance in the same quantity and that are “used in the same 
way.”42  
Under this new regime, which came into place on the basis of the 
ruling of the Danish Maritime and Commercial High Court in the 
Danish pregabalin case, pharmacies are not to substitute a generic 
medicinal product for the brand if the prescription has been issued for 
the treatment of a patent-protected indication. the Danish Medicines 
Agency43 is to notify pharmacies when a medicinal product has a 
patented indication. It is for the pharmaceutical companies to notify 
the Danish Medicines Agency in writing of such patent protection for 
its products.  
On the other hand, pharmacies must substitute a generic medicine 
for the brand if the medicinal product has been prescribed for the 
treatment of a non-patented indication. This is only possible in a 
system where prescribers are required to note for what purpose the 
                                                                                                                
 
40 ePrescribing is a term used to describe computer based, generation of 
prescriptions and electronic transmission directly to the pharmacist. 
41 The Danish Ministerial Order on Prescriptions, § 38 and § 38 a (the latter 
introducing the new regime). 
42 The example given of medicines that are “used in the same way” is that tablets 
and capsules are both for oral intake.  
43 The Danish Health Autority was recently split up into four different authorities 
and the relevant authority today is the Danish Medicines Agency. The Agency 
has in this connection invited the pharmaceutical companies to make the 
Agency aware of they are the proprietor of a patent on a specific indication, 
but this is not included as such in the law. 
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drug is being prescribed. 
 
2. Confidentiality Concerns 
 
The desire to protect patient confidentiality may be seen as a 
reason to oppose prescription by indication. If such a system is to 
work, robust data protection regimes will be necessary. Technological 
advances should reassure patients that their personal health 
information is secure and will remain confidential. After dispensing, 
there is no need to maintain a link between the individual and the 
prescribed product simply for purposes of recording and analyzing 
data on the number of prescriptions dispensed for each indication. The 
data should be anonymized before it is enters a database that for 
monitoring prescriptions by indication that could potentially be used 
to facilitate the enforcement of patents for repurposed drugs. 
 
C.  Issue: Regulatory Exclusivity 
 
1. The Current System 
 
The medicines regulatory system is harmonized in Europe. The 
European Medicines Directive44 rewards the investment and risk of 
bringing a product to market with a prescribed period of time, during 
which no unauthorized third party may obtain a generic marketing 
authorization for the same medicinal product.45 The reward of 
regulatory protection may therefore incentivize investment without 
the onerous patent system requirements of novelty and inventive step. 
Regulatory exclusivities can be a powerful tool for marketing 
authorization holders that can be enforced against third parties. In 
2014, the Court of Justice in the European Union in the Olainfarm 
case46 gave judicial backing to the right of marketing authorization 
holders to challenge the grant of marketing authorization to third 
parties in breach of regulatory exclusivity. 
A market authorization holder benefits from the period of 
                                                                                                                
 
44 Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 
November 2001 on the Community Code relating to medicinal products for 
human use, 2001 O.J. (L 311) 67. 
45 Id. at art. 10. 
46 See C-104/12, Olainfarm (Judgment), 2014 ECR. 
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marketing and data exclusivity that attaches to a new product 
authorized under a “full” application. A full application must include 
substantial safety and efficacy data generated from large scale clinical 
trials. This route to gaining marketing authorization is usually only 
used for the approval of new drugs where there is no pre-existing 
safety and efficacy data, and so significant data must be generated by 
the company developing the drug.  
Any new products authorized via a full marketing authorization 
application made since November 20, 2005 benefit from a period of 
eight years of "data exclusivity", during which no third party may rely 
on the data provided in the marketing authorization dossier for the 
purposes of obtaining a generic marketing authorization.47 The period 
runs from the date of marketing authorization grant. There is a 
concurrent ten-year period of "market exclusivity" during which the 
third party cannot use its authorization to market the generic product 
for another two years. This period holds even if the third party has 
obtained a generic marketing authorization by relying on the data in 
the reference product dossier following the expiry of the eight-year 
data exclusivity term. 48 
The regulatory protection system contains further mechanisms 
that aim to incentivize research and development of novel products, 
and to some extent try to incentivize further development of products 
that have already received marketing authorization. These are 
described briefly below. 
 
 
a. +1 Market Exclusivity 
 
If a marketing authorization holder produces the necessary data to 
show safety and efficacy for an authorized product in a new treatment 
indication within the first eight years of authorization, they will be 
rewarded with an extra year of market exclusivity.49 This means that, 
where a holder could produce the safety and efficacy data, the 
                                                                                                                
 
47  See supra note 41. 
48  Id. 
49 Council Directive 01/83, art. 10(1), 2001 O.J. (L 311/67) (EC). 
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medicinal product would benefit from eleven years of market 
exclusivity in total.50 
One year of data exclusivity is also available for prescription 
products that are reclassified to products available over the counter as 
a result of significant pre-clinical tests or clinical trials.51 
In addition, one year of data exclusivity is currently available for 
new indications developed for well-established substances provided 
that “significant” pre-clinical or clinical studies have been carried out 
in relation to the new indication.52 
 
b. Orphan Market Exclusivity 
 
In 2001, new European legislation introduced a reward of market 
exclusivity for companies that developed drugs for treatment of so-
called “orphan conditions.”53 This legislation was designed to 
incentivize discovery of treatments for conditions that would not 
otherwise garner the interest of pharmaceutical companies, either 
because there are a very small number of patients who would require 
such treatment or because of other factors that mean the treatment area 
would otherwise not receive financial investment.54  
Orphan market exclusivity lasts for ten years from the grant of 
market authorization of the product for the orphan indication.55 It 
differs from the scope of data and market protection offered to non-
orphan products. It is in one sense narrower in that it protects only the 
orphan indication. It does not, for example, prevent a third party from 
obtaining a marketing authorization for the same product in a different 
indication. It is, however, broader in scope and duration than “normal” 
data exclusivity and market exclusivity because it prevents regulatory 
authorities from accepting an application for a marketing 
authorization for any similar medicinal product in the same indication 
for a period of ten years.56 Exclusivity is therefore granted, not just for 
                                                                                                                
 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at art. 74(a) 
52 Id. at art. 10(5) 
53 Council Regulation 141/2000, 1999 O.J. (L 18/1) (EC) (the Orphan Regulation). 
54  Id. recitals. 
55  Id. at Article 8(1). 
56  Id. 
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identical products–but also for similar products. 
 
c. PIPs and Pediatric Extensions  
 
All medicines for which marketing authorization applications 
were made on or after July 26, 2008, are required either to have 
research conducted into the safety and efficacy of the drug in pediatric 
populations by completing an agreed pediatric investigation plan 
(“PIP”), or to agree to a waiver.57 The waiver exception may apply 
where it would be unnecessary or inappropriate to conduct studies in 
pediatric populations or where it may be shown that the treatment does 
not represent a significant therapeutic benefit over existing treatments 
for pediatric patients. 
Completion of the PIP brings with it reward, even if it fails to lead 
to the authorization of a pediatric indication.58 The type of reward 
obtained for PIP completion depends on the regulatory status of the 
product in question. For non-orphan designated products that are 
protected by an SPC (or a patent that is eligible for grant of an SPC) 
the patent holder will be rewarded with a six-month extension of their 
SPC.59 For orphan designated products, the term of orphan market 
exclusivity will be extended from ten to twelve years.60 
The pediatric medicines legislation also introduced pediatric use 
marketing authorizations or PUMAs.61 These are a dedicated 
marketing authorization for medicinal products indicated exclusively 
                                                                                                                
 
57 Council Regulation 1901/06, 2006 O.J. (L 378/1) (EU). This regulation is 
referred to as the “Pediatric Regulation.” There were also provisions 
introduced in this Regulation to require that MA holders who wished to add 
new indications, including pediatric indications, new pharmaceutical forms 
and new routes of administration to their MA would be required to complete a 
PIP, even for products for which the MA application was made prior to 26 
July 2008. 
58 Provided that the results of the studies conducted are reflected in the summary 
of product characteristics and, if appropriate, in the package leaflet of the 
medicinal product. See Id. at art. 36, 37. 
59 Council Regulation 1901/06, art. 36, 2006 O.J. (L 378/1) (EU). 
60 Id. art. 37. 
61 Id. art. 30. 
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for use in the pediatric population, or subsets thereof. PUMA 
applications benefit from an 8 + 2 period of data and market 
protection. They are also eligible for a partial exemption from certain 
application fees.62 In fact, PUMAs serve as an example of a regulatory 
exclusivity right incentive system that has been largely ineffective. 
Industry was not convinced that a PUMA would prevent off-label use 
of the earlier product authorized within the PUMA product’s pediatric 
indication. As such, very few companies have shown an interest in 
PUMA authorization. 
 
2. Regulatory Exclusivities for Repurposed Drugs 
 
Some of the regulatory measures to incentivize development of 
already authorized medicines appear successful. For example, a great 
number of marketing authorization holders have conducted the work 
necessary to obtain the +1 market exclusivity extension for adding a 
new indication of “significant clinical benefit” within the first eight 
years of grant of the marketing authorization. The year of exclusivity 
available for new indications for well-established substances may 
provide some incentive for developing new indications for known 
drugs. However, the number of indications actually approved via this 
route seems to be relatively few, suggesting that it is not a particularly 
effective incentive. The year of exclusivity available for prescription 
products that can be converted to over-the-counter products bestows 
a real advantage in that market. The pediatric legislation has also 
generated treatments for pediatric populations that would not 
otherwise have been investigated and authorized. The legislation 
makes such work a requirement for the grant of a marketing 
authorization, (subject to any waiver) but the incentives on offer are 
attractive to marketing authorization holders.  
Unfortunately, the regulatory system in Europe does not yet 
contain effective incentives for the development of known drugs once 
the initial 10 + 1 year period of regulatory exclusivity has expired. The 
legislation stipulates that all developments of a given medicinal 
                                                                                                                
 
62 European Medicine Agency Questions and answers on the paediatric use 
marketing authorisation (PUMA) EMA/753370/2011 Rev 1, at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2011/09/WC
500112071.pdf  
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product made by the original developer (e.g. new indications, new 
methods of administration, dosing regimes, etc.) will fall within what 
is known as the same “global marketing authorization” (“GMA”) for 
that product.63 The date of the first authorization is the date from 
which the regulatory exclusivity attaching to all of the products within 
the same GMA will run. The purpose of the GMA concept is to 
prevent marketing authorization holders from effectively extending 
the monopoly enjoyed by their product by obtaining new periods of 
regulatory exclusivity for every minor development of their product. 
This is sometimes referred to as "evergreening". Assuming there is no 
patent protection in place, this allows generic products to compete 
effectively with the original product once the relevant period of 
regulatory exclusivity has expired.  But, on the other hand, it leaves 
little room for reward for a genuine innovation related to a repurposed 
drug. Currently, the protection provided by regulatory exclusivities is 
inadequate incentive in itself to promote investigation into new uses 
for known drugs. 
 
 
 
 
D.  Potential Solution: A New Market Exclusivity Right 
 
It would be perfectly possible to devise a new market or data 
exclusivity right to protect repurposed drugs. The reward available 
should be proportionate with the size and/or value of the innovation. 
For example, the duration of the exclusivity can be shorter for 
innovation in known compounds than it is for new compounds. To 
achieve this, it may be necessary, as with the orphan medicinal 
product system, to show that certain requirements are met in order to 
receive the reward of exclusivity. For example, the treatment provides 
                                                                                                                
 
63 Council Directive 01/83, art. 6(1), 2001 O.J. (L 311/67) (EC) (The only way that 
a follow on product e.g. isomer, mixture of isomers, complex or derivative or 
salt of a previously authorized subject can come outside of the GMA of the 
earlier product is if the applicant can show that the development differs in 
properties with regard to safety and efficacy from the substance previously 
authorized).  
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a significant benefit over pre-existing treatments and/or the treatment 
meets an otherwise unmet need. This reward is much more flexible as 
compared to the patent system. 
Without changes to prescribing and dispensing systems, the 
enforcement of any such new regulatory exclusivity right would run 
into the same sorts of problems as are currently seen in the 
enforcement of second medical use patents. The earlier authorized 
product will still be open to generic competition at some stage during 
the regulatory exclusivity of the later developed product. It may be 
that the earlier product is open to generic competition prior to 
authorization of the later product. Assuming that the dosage forms and 
strengths, etc. are equivalent, the difficulty, as with the patent system, 
is in preventing off-label use of the earlier authorized product for the 
newly discovered use. This makes the market for the “repurposed 
product” substantially less attractive than for a new medicinal product. 
A new market exclusivity right would only provide an attractive 
reward and therefore an effective incentive for repurposing of known 
drugs if it were coupled with a system of mandatory prescription by 
indication, as discussed above in relation to the enforcement of patent 
protection. Such a system would ensure that only the developer of the 
repurposed product would benefit from the new prescriptions and 
increased market generated by the development of the repurposed 
drug. 
 
E.  Issue: Pricing and Reimbursement 
 
The price that can be achieved for any pharmaceutical product is 
a key incentive for developing it and bringing it to market. In Europe, 
procedures for determining the pricing and reimbursement of 
medicines are not harmonized. Pricing and reimbursement are 
therefore set through the different health schemes in each country and 
the applicable rules differ in each country. Nevertheless, some broad 
observations about pricing and reimbursement in Europe can be 
drawn. Most national price and reimbursement systems and legislation 
in Europe focus on cost containment measures and do not currently 
incentivize the development of repurposed drugs.   
As things currently stand, it is very difficult to get a premium price 
for a repurposed drug product. If the drug is known, and there is no 
patent protection covering the repurposed drug, the product will most 
likely get a generic price. It is doubtful that the payers will even 
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engage in a discussion about the added value that such repurposed 
drugs can provide. These drugs are likely to be clustered with the 
pharmaceutical products containing the same active substance no 
matter how beneficial they are to the patients and society as a whole. 
It may be also possible—for example in Germany—that such drugs 
will be tendered together with price being often the only 
differentiating selection criteria and taking no notice of the additional 
patient health benefit.64   
Even if the repurposed drug is covered by a patent, it is 
questionable whether the developer will be able to get a premium price 
for repurposing these medicines. Below, two different types of 
repurposed drugs provide examples of how the current system may 
preclude them from gaining a price that reflects the investment that 
must be made to develop them. 
 
1. New formulations 
 
New formulations can provide significant benefits to patients.  For 
example, reformulating a drug that needs to be injected into one that 
can be taken orally as a tablet provides increased convenience for the 
patient and is likely to improve patient compliance with the course of 
treatment. Despite these potential benefits for patients, the price of 
reformulated drugs is usually based on a benchmark of the price of the 
old product.  
Germany is a good example of a country where the benchmark for 
the price of a new formulation is the price of the old product. Indeed, 
in 2003 a mandatory manufacturer's rebate of 6 percent was 
introduced in Germany (which has been increased up to 16 percent 
from 2010 to 2014, currently reduced to 7 percent). It applied to 
patented medicinal products, available on prescription only, for which 
no reference price group exists and which are dispensed by 
community pharmacies or hospital pharmacies for the out-patient 
sector.  In context of this regime, the German legislator also 
introduced a price moratorium in 2010, which rules that newly 
introduced medicinal products identical in active substance and 
                                                                                                                
 
64 See E.g., decision of the 2nd Public Procurement Tribunal on 29 January 2015 
(VK 2 – 119/14); see also Section 130a (8) Social Code Book 5. 
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comparable in pharmaceutical form to medicinal products already 
placed on the market in the past by the same pharmaceutical 
entrepreneur, may only be priced on the basis of the initial product; a 
new indication is not relevant.65 A significant increase from 6 to 16 
percent was imposed in 2010 and in order to avoid circumventions of 
this rebate by increasing the price, a “price moratorium” was created 
at the same time.66 According to this price moratorium, newly 
introduced medicinal products identical in active substance and 
comparable in pharmaceutical form to medicinal products already 
placed on the market in the past by the same pharmaceutical 
entrepreneur, may only be priced on the basis of the initial product. 
The price moratorium and the respective anti-avoidance regulation 
therefore apply to new formulations, which must be priced on basis of 
the price of the first product. This cost containment regime applies 
regardless of whether the new formulation is also authorized for 
additional indications. 
Under this German rebate regime, the price may actually be lower 
for the new or improved formulation. Supposing that a company 
developed a new dosage regimen of a known drug that involves less 
active substance than the original product, the company would be 
likely to obtain a lower price for the new formulation. Indeed, the price 
of the new formulation will be proportionate to the amount of active 
substance in the pharmaceutical product.67 Therefore even though the 
new formulation is more convenient for the patient and less likely to 
trigger adverse events, it will get a price lower than the price of the 
original product. 
Another example comes from Poland, where the local 
medicines regulations require that the first “equivalent” of an 
authorized medicine must be priced 25 percent lower than the earlier 
authorized drug in the first authorized formulation.68 This is 
irrespective of whether the new “equivalent medicine” is a simple 
                                                                                                                
 
65 Section 130a (1a) and (3a) Social Code Book 5; Bundestagsdrucksache 18/201, 
7 sqq. 
66 Section 130a [3a] Social Code Book Five. 
67 Regulation of the GKV-Spitzenverband according to Section 130a (3a) Social 
Code Book 5, dated as of 22 October 2010; Bundestagsdrucksache 17/2170, 
37 sqq. 
68 Act of 12 May 2011 on Reimbursement of Medicines, Foodstuffs Intended for 
Particular Nutritional Use and Medical Devices  (Journal of Laws of 2015 
item 345 as amended). 
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copy of the known drug for the same indication or whether it is a novel 
formulation, which may provide additional health benefits in areas of 
important patient unmet need.  
 
2. New uses 
 
Repurposing a known drug by identifying and testing new 
therapeutic uses for the product and subsequently extending the 
authorized therapeutic indications by the marketing authorization 
holder of the first use is one of the events that may trigger a re-
negotiation of the price and reimbursement for this product with the 
relevant authorities.69 During the re-negotiation, the authorities will 
most likely claim that the figures on which the original price were 
granted, mainly in respect of the estimated consumption, are no longer 
valid and will put pressure the marketing authorization holder to bring 
the price down. Often, when the relevant pricing authority estimates 
an increase in the consumption of the product due to the new 
indications approved, the price is likely to be reduced in order to 
maintain a fixed expenditure for the product. Such an approach 
actually discourages development of new uses for medicines that are 
already on the market. The marketing authorization holder is unlikely 
to get a premium price for the new use but the development may also 
trigger a price cut for the existing use. 
 
F.  Potential Solution: Differentiation by Indication 
 
Although there are problems with the current situation, pricing and 
reimbursement systems also present opportunities for the reward of 
repurposing drugs. More advantageous pricing could be offered for 
products in new indications of established drugs. Again, this would 
require the introduction of data gathering on the use for which a drug 
                                                                                                                
 
69 An example is the Italian CIPE determination laying down the P&R procedure, 
dated 1 February 2001, article 7. In Germany it is for medicines falling under 
the AMNOG regime cf. Section 130b [3a] Social Code Book Five. Article 94 
of the Spanish Medicinal Products Act 25/1990 and Article R163-12 of the 
French Code de la sécurité sociale contain similar provisions. 
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is being prescribed. There could be different prices offered for 
different therapeutic value.  
 
1. An Example: Reimbursement in Belgium 
 
Belgium operates a system whereby the list of medicinal products 
that are eligible for reimbursement is divided into “chapters” 
depending on the nature or reimbursement status of the product. For 
products included in chapter I, all registered indications are 
reimbursed, whereas the reimbursement of products included in 
chapter II and IV is subject to specific conditions.70 This allows 
reimbursement of a given pharmaceutical to differ depending upon the 
use for which it is prescribed. 
 
II. Facilitating Access to Innovation 
 
Incentives are not the only factor to consider when analyzing the 
future of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry and how to 
encourage the development of repurposed drug products. Another 
important factor to consider is access to innovation. Examples of the 
different areas to which access needs to be improved in order to 
facilitate innovation are described below. 
 
A.  Access to Pipeline 
 
Collaborations that allow exchange of information relating to 
industry drug portfolios and pipelines will be key to successful 
repurposing of known drugs going forward. Collaborations might 
include those between industry partners or between industry and 
academic institutions or governments. Collaborations, whereby 
industry portfolios and expertise are shared, are more likely to 
generate viable repurposed products. An example of such an initiative 
is provided by the activities of the UK-based Medical Research 
Council (“MRC”).71 The MRC is a non-departmental public body 
funded through the UK Government's science and research budget. It 
                                                                                                                
 
70 Art. 1, 11° of the Belgian Royal Decree of 21 December 2001 on the 
procedures, terms and conditions regarding the reimbursement of medicinal 
products. 
71 More information about the MRC can be found at http://www.mrc.ac.uk/  
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has run a number of initiatives with the pharmaceutical industry that 
seek to harness the potential of open access to data to drive 
development of known drugs. GlaxoSmithKline, AstraZeneca, Pfizer, 
and Johnson & Johnson have all contributed experimental compounds 
to the public domain for development with the MRC. The compounds 
that have been contributed are those that have received millions of 
dollars of research effort from their donors but that have failed to reach 
the market as intended for commercial or other reasons.72 UK 
academics are to apply for MRC funding to study the compounds. The 
company contributing the compound would have first option on 
development rights to any new medicines arising from the research.73  
The MRC has also entered into a strategic collaboration with 
AstraZeneca to create a center for early drug discovery at the 
AstraZeneca R&D center in Cambridge, UK.74 The idea is that MRC-
sponsored researchers will work alongside AstraZeneca scientists in 
the screening group to “identify new methods to better understand a 
range of diseases and potential treatment options.” Under the scheme, 
AstraZeneca have granted access to over two million molecules in 
their compound library. 
 
B. Access to Data and Data Mining Tools 
 
Over the past five or so years, ease of access to data and the 
sophistication with which it may be manipulated and analyzed have 
opened the pharmaceutical industry up to new businesses, new 
business models, and new routes to discovery of better treatments.  
There is an emerging trend towards encouraging opening up 
access to clinical data by policy makers in Europe. The first of January 
2015 saw the entry into effect of the European Medicines Agency’s 
                                                                                                                
 
72  Id. 
73  Id. 
74 See AstraZeneca and MRC enter strategic collaboration to create new centre 
for early drug discovery in Cambridge, UK, MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL 
(Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.mrc.ac.uk/news/browse/astrazeneca-and-mrc-
enter-strategic-collaboration-to-create-new-centre-for-early-drug-discovery-
in-cambridge-uk/.  
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clinical transparency provisions for all marketing authorization 
applications submitted after that date.75 Amongst other things, this 
policy requires the proactive publication of all clinical and non-
clinical data submitted as part of the marketing authorization 
application.76 This will equate to the publication of an unprecedented 
volume of data regarding drug behavior, efficacy, and safety. Anyone 
wishing to access data under the scheme will be required to confirm 
that such use is not for commercial purposes.77 Nevertheless, it signals 
the beginning of even greater availability of information that may lead 
to better understanding and dissemination of data regarding how drugs 
work. Increased understanding brings with it the potential to discover 
new treatments. 
There are already examples of businesses in the health care 
industry that have become successful largely because of their ability 
to gather and analyze data. For instance, part of the California 
biotechnology company 23andMe’s business78 is providing a saliva-
based direct-to-consumer personal genome test that relies on 
compiling and comparing data against a huge genome database. One 
of the other parts of the business is using the large pool of data that 
they have to partner with academics and industry.79 They are even said 
to be pursing drug development themselves.80  
The example described above shows that analyses of datasets of 
known drug behavior can suggest direction for further research. Such 
analyses may be conducted relatively inexpensively and may 
potentially open up drug discovery and development to additional 
                                                                                                                
 
75 For more information on the EMA’s clinical trials transparency policy, see 
Background to clinical data publication policy, EUROPEAN MEDICINES 
AGENCY, 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/special_topics/general/g
eneral_content_000556.jsp (last visited May 23, 2016).  
76  Id. 
77  Id. 
78 See 23ANDME,  https://www.23andme.com/en-gb/ (last visited May 23, 2016). 
79 23andMe sets stage for stronger ties with pharma, FIERCEBIOTECH (Nov. 29, 
2012, 7:43 AM), http://www.fiercebiotech.com/story/23andme-sets-stage-
stronger-ties-pharma/2012-11-29. 
80 Forbes interview with Ann Wojcicki 23andMe’s founder and CEO. See 
Matthew Herper, In Big Shift, 23andMe Will Invent Drugs Using Customer 
Data, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2015, 8:01 AM),   
http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2015/03/12/23andme-enters-the-
drug-business-just-as-apple-changes-it/#7dc1a8992278. 
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players in the industry, and with it the potential for increased 
innovation and competition. Collected information on known drug 
mechanisms of action can drive virtual drug discovery, either in 
suggesting new uses for known drugs or predicting the effects of 
untested drugs. In the near term, the potential is clear for these sorts 
of analyses to suggest new uses for known drugs. Developing known 
drugs for new purposes in this way is particularly attractive because it 
brings with it the advantage of knowing that such drugs are safe, 
thereby bypassing the need to extensively test the safety of that 
product, and so shortening the development timeline; making it more 
predictable and lowering cost.  
Until relatively recently, discovery of new uses for known drugs 
has often been by serendipity. Well-known and successful drug 
repurposings, such as Viagra, were discovered whilst testing the drugs 
for treatment of other unrelated disorders. “Big data” gives the 
potential for greater direction for this route of discovering new 
treatments. For example, Dr. Dakshanamurthy of Georgetown 
University in Washington D.C.81 has matched publically available 
data about the structure of drug molecules with databases of proteins 
found in the human body and the sort of molecules they interact with. 
When testing the model they found it was able in 91 percent of the 
3,671 drugs tested to match a drug to a protein known to be its target.82 
It is easy to imagine how a system with a sufficient volume of suitably 
specific data could create fast and reliable suggestions for alternate 
uses for known molecules. Indeed, the researchers showed that the 
system was already able to suggest avenues for possible future 
research, both of new uses for known products and even of molecules 
that have not yet been produced physically.83 
 
C. Regulatory Early Access Tools 
 
The European Medicines Agency is making serious attempts to be 
able to provide swift market access for medicines using the legislative 
                                                                                                                
 
81 See Computers may give new life to old medicines, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 11, 
2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21560236. 
82  Id. 
83  Id. 
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tools currently available. A pragmatic approach to regulatory 
assessment with shorter regulatory assessment procedures that take 
into account real life evidence are best suited for innovations related 
to new uses for old molecules. The risk to patients is greatly reduced 
where the product has already undergone the safety testing necessary 
to take the product to market. Faster regulatory access schemes would 
be a valuable tool in opening up the pharmaceutical industry to new 
entrants and increasing innovation. Shorter, cheaper, and more 
effective regulatory processes with reduced time to market can help to 
increase innovation by reducing cost and lowering the barriers to 
market entry. 
Some examples of the ways in which the established medicine 
regulatory process is being adapted to provide fast, intelligent market 
access for novel medicinal products are described below. 
Overwhelmingly these processes are reserved at present for medicines 
that serve the most urgent and important patient need. Hopefully, 
some of these processes, or processes similar to them, will be available 
more widely in the future, and will be used to encourage market access 
for new medicines developed from known substances, since their 
known safety profiles should allow shortened research and 
development timelines. 
 
1. STAMP 
 
In 2015 the European Commission set up STAMP (the 
Commission Expert Group on Safe and Timely Access to Medicines 
for Patients). 84 The goal of STAMP is stated as being to “exchange 
views and information about the experience of Member States, 
examine national initiatives and identify ways to use the existing EU 
regulatory tools more effectively. The main goal is to further improve 
safe and timely access and availability of medicines for patients.”85 
Under active consideration by STAMP at the moment are conditional 
                                                                                                                
 
84 See Early access tools: accelerated assessment and conditional marketing 
authorization, EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY (Oct. 15, 2015), 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Presentation/2015/
11/WC500196321.pdf and Commission Expert Group on Safe and Timely 
Access to Medicines for Patients ("STAMP"), EUROPEAN COMMISSION,  
http://ec.europa.eu/health/documents/pharmaceutical-
committee/stamp/index_en.htm (last visited May 23 2015). 
85  Id. 
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marketing authorizations, accelerated assessment and PRIME and 
adaptive pathways. These alternative routes to marketing 
authorization operate under current EU regulatory tools. 
 
2. Conditional Marketing Authorizations 
 
A conditional marketing authorization is available currently in 
specific circumstances where the benefit-risk balance of a given 
product is such that the need for immediate availability of the product 
outweighs the limitations of having less comprehensive data than 
would otherwise be required to grant marketing authorization.86 This 
is typically the case for products where there is a patient population 
with unmet medical need, seriously debilitating or life-threatening 
disease, a rare disease, or use in emergency situations.87 In such cases, 
it is possible for the European Medicines Agency’s Committee for 
Medicinal Products for Human Use to recommend the early approval 
of a marketing authorization on the basis of less complete clinical data, 
and subject to certain specific pharmacovigilance88 and other data 
collection obligations. The granting of a conditional marketing 
authorization allows medicines to reach patients with unmet medical 
needs earlier than might otherwise be the case, and ensures that 
additional data on a product are generated, submitted, assessed, and 
acted upon. 
The Netherlands’ Ministry of Health launched a project in 2011 to 
investigate whether it might be possible to encourage further 
development of known authorized medicines for treatment of new 
                                                                                                                
 
86 Provision for conditional marketing authorizations is made in Regulation (EC) 
No. 726/2004 laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and 
supervisions of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and 
establishing a European Medicines Agency and they are further defined in 
Regulation (EC) No. 507/2006 on the conditional marketing authorisation for 
medicinal products for human use falling within the scope of Regulation (EC) 
No 726/2004. 
87  Id. 
88  Pharmacovigilance is the term used for monitoring the effects of drugs after 
they have been licensed for use, especially in order to identify and evaluate 
previously unreported adverse reactions. 
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diseases, so-called “drug rediscovery.”89 The rationale is that without 
some incentive, industry will not further develop known drugs. 
Quicker and easier routes to market may be one such incentive, in 
particular where there is already known off-label use of that product.   
 
3. Accelerated Assessment 
 
The pharmaceutical legislation contains within it provisions for 
“accelerated assessment procedures” to meet the “legitimate 
expectations of patients and to take account of the increasingly rapid 
progress of science and therapies.”90 These accelerated procedures are 
reserved under the legislation for medicinal products of major 
therapeutic interest and may be requested by the applicant for 
authorization of such a medicine when making an application.  What 
is meant by “major therapeutic interest” or “major public health 
interest” is not defined. It will be for the applicant to justify eligibility 
for the procedure and in particular that the medicinal product 
addresses to a significant extent the “unmet medical needs for 
maintaining and improving the health of the Community.” This will 
be assessed on a case-by-case basis.  
 
4. Adaptive Licensing  
 
The concept of adaptive licensing seeks to maximize the positive 
impact of new drugs on public health by balancing timely access for 
patients with the need to provide adequate evolving information on 
benefits and harms. This will be done by using the existing regulatory 
processes within the existing EU legal framework. 
Medicines Adaptive Pathways to Patients (MAPPs) or Adaptive 
Pathways is an EU-level initiative that seeks to provide timely and 
potential early access to promising medicines that address significant 
unmet medical needs.91 The general principle is that approval and 
                                                                                                                
 
89 Stimulering van Drug Rediscovery, ZonMw, The Netherlands Organisation for 
Health Research and Development. 
90 See Regulation No 726/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 136). 
91 See Adaptive pathways, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/regulation/general/gener
al_content_000601.jsp (last visited May 23, 2015). 
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reimbursement decisions are made using a more flexible framework, 
allowing launch of the therapy based on limited, yet clearly promising, 
evidence that can be expanded and assessed regularly post-launch. 
A pilot scheme was started in 2014 in which the European 
Medicines Agency called for the involvement of real-world medicines 
in development.92 The European Medicines Agency plan to make their 
first report on the pilot scheme in 2016 but have already reported to 
STAMP on their initial experiences with it. To date, 20 candidate 
products have been selected for in-depth discussion of the adaptive 
licensing pathway with the applicant. 
 
5. PRIME scheme (Priority Medicines) 
 
The PRIME (PRIority MEdicines) scheme is a European 
Medicines Agency initiative which aims to enhance early dialogue to 
facilitate accelerated assessment of priority medicines.93 It is part of 
the European Medicines Agency initiative to accelerate patient access 
to medicines that address unmet needs. This includes the adaptive 
pathways pilot, the accelerated assessment, and conditional marketing 
authorization pathways.94 PRIME is concurrent to those initiatives, 
seeking to review their impact on authorization of priority medicines. 
It also considers how to enhance and reinforce early dialogue and 
regulatory support to stimulate innovation, optimize development, 
and enable accelerated assessment of these medicines. As with 
accelerated development, conditional marketing authorizations and 
adaptive processing, PRIME is focused on medicines of major public 
health interest and within the existing regulatory framework. The 
                                                                                                                
 
92 For more information about the launch of the pilot project, see Press Release, 
European Medicines Agency,  
 European Medicines Agency launches adaptive licensing pilot project (Mar. 19, 
2004), available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Press_release/2014/
03/WC500163410.pdf. 
93 The October 2015 EMA Reflection Paper on PRIME may be found at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Regulatory_and_pr
ocedural_guideline/2015/10/WC500196065.pdf 
94  Id. 
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PRIME initiative is currently under public consultation. The European 
Medicines Agency expects to launch PRIME in the first quarter of 
2016. 
 
6. ADAPT SMART  
 
ADAPT SMART stands for Accelerated Development of 
Appropriate Patients Therapies, a Sustainable, Multi-stakeholder 
Approach from Research to Treatment-outcomes.95 This is an 
initiative led by the European Medicines Agency and run in parallel 
to the adaptive pathways pilot project. The ADAPT SMART program 
was set up to investigate the conceptual framework that may, in the 
future, be used in adaptive pathways, including tools and 
methodologies.96 ADAPT SMART is run by the Innovative Medicines 
Initiative (IMI2), the European public-private collaboration for which 
the European Medicines Agency is the scientific leader.97 The aim of 
the ADAPT SMART initiative is to facilitate and accelerate the 
availability of the MAPPs pathway to authorization to all healthcare 
stakeholders.  
 
D. Access to Funding 
 
It may not be possible to encourage the development of new uses 
for known drugs if the funding for such research must come entirely 
from the pharmaceutical industry. The industry has already shown that 
it is willing to explore government partnerships and increased 
interaction with academia in order to increase development 
opportunities and lead to the discovery of new treatments. An example 
of such collaboration is the Innovative Medicines Initiative (“IMI”).98 
The IMI is Europe's largest public-private initiative, which supports 
                                                                                                                
 
95 For more information, see Committee For Medicinal Products for Human Use, 
Reflection paper on a proposal to enhance early dialogue to facilitate 
accelerated assessment of priority medicines (PRIME), (European Medicines 
Agency, Working Paper 2015) available at http://adaptsmart.eu/adapt-smart-
kick-off-meeting-the-innovative-medicines-initiatives-adapt-smart-laying-the-
foundations-and-building-consensus-to-make-mapps-work-for-all. 
96  Id. 
97  Id. 
98 See IMI, http://www.imi.europa.eu/ (last visited May 23, 2015). 
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collaborative research projects and builds networks of industrial and 
academic experts in order to boost pharmaceutical innovation in 
Europe. It is a partnership between the European Union (represented 
by the European Commission) and the pharmaceutical industry 
(represented by EFPIA).  
Launched in 2008, IMI is the world's biggest public-private 
partnership in the life sciences.99 The aim of the initiative is to speed 
up development of, and improve patient access to, innovative 
medicines (particularly in areas of unmet medical or social need). The 
IMI invites consortia of small and medium-sized enterprises, mid-
sized companies, patients’ organizations, regulatory authorities, 
academic teams, industry, hospitals, and other organizations to 
respond to or generate proposals for projects that will address the 
challenges that affect public health. The IMI provides funding and 
other support for these projects. 
The IMI operates a number of projects, some of which are focused 
on specific health issues and some of which are focused on broader 
challenges in drug development–such as drug/vaccine safety and the 
use of stem cells for drug discovery.100 A number of the IMI initiatives 
use big data and modeling to aid treatment discovery. For example, 
the Pharma-Cog initiative aims to predict cognitive properties of new 
drug candidates for neurodegenerative diseases in early clinical 
development.101 Pharma-Cog seeks to bring together databases of 
previously conducted clinical trials and combine the results from 
blood tests, brain scans, and behavioral tests, to develop a 'signature' 
that will give more accurate information on the progression of the 
disease and the likely effect of candidate drugs than current 
methods.102 Alongside the modeling, studies are conducted with 
laboratory models, healthy volunteers, and patients in order to better 
predict good new drugs as early as possible. 
Claimed successes of the IMI program include the generation of a 
line of human pancreatic beta cells (the cells which go wrong in 
                                                                                                                
 
99  Id. 
100  Id. 
101  Id. 
102  Id. 
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diabetes), the creation of a simple computer test that predicts if a 
potential drug will be harmful to the heart, and the creation of novel 
clinical trial designs for schizophrenia and Alzheimer’s disease 
treatments.103 
 
E. Access to Patients 
 
As the transparency requirements with respect to the industry’s 
clinical data increases, so does patients’ online access to information 
regarding medical conditions and treatment. European laws that 
prohibit advertising of prescription medicines to patients act 
effectively as a bar to the pharmaceutical industry discussing their 
treatments with patients based in the European Union.104 Attempts by 
the European Commission to introduce new laws to increase patient 
access to reliable information on prescription medicines have been 
rejected;105 the often cited concern being that changes to these laws 
may lead to a US-style market in which consumers are marketed to by 
the pharmaceutical industry rather than provided with the information 
with which to help them make their own decisions.   
However, the lack of territorial boundaries online means that 
patients who want to read about treatments and share their questions 
and concerns will find the information somewhere. Inaccurate and 
untested information may thrive in an environment in which those 
with the most information about the treatments in question, being the 
pharmaceutical industry, are prevented from engaging in the 
discussion. New laws that may meet the objective of providing 
patients with the information they want and require, but that 
respectfully maintain a limitation on large-scale “advertising” (in the 
traditional sense), would be a welcome development to increasing 
patient focused innovation. The industry could listen actively to their 
customers and provide feedback with a level of understanding and 
                                                                                                                
 
103  Id. 
104  Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 
November 2001 on the Community Code relating to medicinal products for 
human use, art. 86 to 100, 2001 O.J. (L 311) 67.  
105 See discussion in 2008 in Pharmaceutical Package, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/human-use/package_en.htm (last visited May 23, 
2015). 
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speed that is not possible currently. It would help them understand 
what the patients want and may guide more patient-focused 
development opportunities. 
 
F. Patent Pools 
 
Patent pools106 can facilitate drug development as they widen 
access to protected technology. Patentee members of a patent pool are 
encouraged to share their drug patents with other members of the pool. 
The members of the pool benefit from availability of the technology 
to, for example, produce the technology themselves or in some cases 
develop the technology without fear of being sued for patent 
infringement by the patentee.  
An example of a patent pool is the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP), 
which is a United Nations-backed organization offering a public 
health-driven business model.107 It was devised on patent pool 
principles and works through a system of voluntary licensing and 
patent pooling. The MPP aims to lower the prices of HIV, 
tuberculosis, hepatitis C, malaria, and tuberculosis treatments in low 
and middle-income countries and to facilitate the development of 
better-adapted medicines.108 Under the MPP, patentees may be 
compensated by a fair royalty under a license. The MPP works with 
governments, industry and international organizations, as well as 
those communities and people affected by HIV. To date, the MPP has 
signed agreements for twelve antiretrovirals with six patent holders 
and is working with 14 manufacturers on more than 50 projects to 
develop HIV-licensed medicines. 
 
G. Access for Third Party Developers 
 
Many of the incentives that aim to encourage research and 
development of new drugs may actually disincentivize further 
                                                                                                                
 
106  A patent pool is formed by a group of patent owners where each agrees to 
cross licence patent rights to the others. 
107 MEDICINES PATENT POOL, http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/ (last visited 
May 23, 2015). 
108  Id. 
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research and development of known drugs by third parties (i.e. by 
anyone other than the originator of the original drug who is the 
compound patent owner and marketing authorization holder).  Patents 
and market exclusivity protecting the known drug will prevent the 
marketing of that product by a third party even if that third party had 
completed studies to show that the product was effective in a different 
treatment area. As it stands, therefore, there is in practice very little 
development of known pharmaceuticals by third parties until after 
patent and SPC expiry. Until then, all development potential lies with 
the holder of the patent for the drug molecule. 
An open question is whether this could be an area for further 
consideration. Could, perhaps, third parties that discover new uses for 
known medicinal products be permitted to benefit from certain carve-
outs of either patent or regulatory protection over the “reference” or 
original product? Might provision be made for the benefit coming 
from the third party development to be shared between the third party 
and the originator? A “softer” option may be that the carveout may 
apply in the EU only to SPCs and regulatory exclusivities rather than 
the patents themselves, where the full 20-year term would have to be 
respected. Another alternative could hypothetically be the adaptation 
of the compulsory licensing provisions. Any such hypothetical regime 
would certainly bring with it the potential to increase the incentive for 
third parties to invest in further investigation of a medicinal product 
once it had gained its initial marketing authorization. The question 
would then be whether the remaining protection for the original drug 
innovation is still sufficient to allow for a fair return.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
A system to reward the development of repurposed drugs has the 
potential to benefit all of the relevant stakeholders. The 
pharmaceutical industry would have more products coming through 
pipeline. Patients would be presented with greater choice of more 
efficacious and safer medicines, more information and certainty 
regarding treatment options, and more timely access to treatment. 
Clinicians would need to rely less on off-label treatments, would have 
a greater number of treatment choices, and could be more confident 
about the information they receive. Finally, the healthcare systems 
will benefit from having healthier patients that may remain 
contributors to society and the national economy. 
38
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol12/iss3/5
2017]  INNOVATION IN KNOWN DRUGS            291 
 
 
 
A system to reward the research and development in known 
medicinal products is justified, but any such system must be 
considered carefully. The goal should be to incentivize and promote 
research and development that lead to new and useful treatments. It 
should not create monopolies over products that restrict legitimate 
market entry and provide disproportionate reward to trivial 
therapeutic advances. The ideal system of incentives would therefore 
offer reward relative to the size of the innovation and patient benefit 
and would be fairly balanced against the benefit to patients of timely 
generic market entry. 
Building such a system requires consideration of both incentives 
to innovate but also how different types of access that facilitate such 
innovation can be improved. A meaningful framework of incentives 
cannot be achieved through changes to either the patent or regulatory 
system in isolation as they operate currently. Changes to prescribing 
and dispensing practices are also required: specifically a method of 
specifying which indication a medicine with more than one use has 
been prescribed for on the prescription is critical. Without knowing 
for what indication a medicinal product is being prescribed and 
dispensed, both the patent and regulatory systems lack the necessary 
data to be able to form the basis of a fair and enforceable system of 
incentives for repurposed drugs. 
As well as incentives, access that facilitates innovation must also 
be considered.  Access to drug portfolios, pipelines, and funding needs 
to be improved through collaboration between industry, governments, 
and academia.  Increased access to clinical data, technology, and 
patients will facilitate informed and targeted drug development.  
Access to the market could be enhanced by the introduction of shorter 
and less onerous regulatory procedures for new uses for known drugs, 
and by allowing early market access for independently developed uses 
for known drugs before the expiry of exclusivity. 
Finally, we need to convince payers to increase their willingness 
to reward the “repurposing” of known drugs. This would involve 
setting up appropriate procedures enabling them to assess the added 
value of these products as well as introducing systems of data 
gathering on the use for which a drug is being prescribed. 
Repurposed drugs have huge potential.  It is important that the 
systems are in place to incentivize and reward the research and 
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development effort required to realize that potential. Getting the 
balance right between incentivizing the development of new drugs and 
encouraging the continued investigation of further possible uses for 
such drugs could bring enormous benefits to all healthcare 
stakeholders.109 
                                                                                                                
 
109 The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author. 
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